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A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume 1: 1913-1951, by Allan H. Meltzer
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Allan H. Meltzer's monumental history of the Federal Reserve System tells the story of one of America's most influential but least understood public institutions. This first volume covers the period from the Federal Reserve's founding in 1913 through the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, which marked the beginning of a larger and greatly changed institution.
To understand why the Federal Reserve acted as it did at key points in its history, Meltzer draws on meeting minutes, correspondence, and other internal documents (many made public only during the 1970s) to trace the reasoning behind its policy decisions. He explains, for instance, why the Federal Reserve remained passive throughout most of the economic decline that led to the Great Depression, and how the Board's actions helped to produce the deep recession of 1937 and 1938. He also highlights the impact on the institution of individuals such as Benjamin Strong, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the 1920s, who played a key role in the adoption of a more active monetary policy by the Federal Reserve. Meltzer also examines the influence the Federal Reserve has had on international affairs, from attempts to build a new international financial system in the 1920s to the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 that established the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and the failure of the London Economic Conference of 1933.
Written by one of the world's leading economists, this magisterial biography of the Federal Reserve and the people who helped shape it will interest economists, central bankers, historians, political scientists, policymakers, and anyone seeking a deep understanding of the institution that controls America's purse strings.
"It was 'an unprecedented orgy of extravagance, a mania for speculation, overextended business in nearly all lines and in every section of the country.' An Alan Greenspan rumination about the irrational exuberance of the late 1990s? Try the 1920 annual report of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve. . . . To understand why the Fed acted as it did—at these critical moments and many others—would require years of study, poring over letters, the minutes of meetings and internal Fed documents. Such a task would naturally deter most scholars of economic history but not, thank goodness, Allan Meltzer."—Wall Street Journal
"A seminal work that anyone interested in the inner workings of the U. S. central bank should read. A work that scholars will mine for years to come."—John M. Berry, Washington Post
"An exceptionally clear story about why, as the ideas that actually informed policy evolved, things sometimes went well and sometimes went badly. . . . One can only hope that we do not have to wait too long for the second installment."—David Laidler, Journal of Economic Literature
"A thorough narrative history of a high order. Meltzer's analysis is persuasive and acute. His work will stand for a generation as the benchmark history of the world's most powerful economic institution. It is an impressive, even awe-inspiring achievement."—Sir Howard Davies, Times Higher Education Supplement
- Sales Rank: #751527 in eBooks
- Published on: 2010-02-15
- Released on: 2010-02-15
- Format: Kindle eBook
From Library Journal
Meltzer (political economy and public policy, Carnegie Mellon Univ.) provides a definitive history of the U.S. Federal Reserve from its founding in 1913 to its establishment as a separate, independent entity in 1951. Using meeting minutes, correspondence, and internal Federal Reserve documents, he traces the reasons behind Federal Reserves policy decisions, highlights the impact that individuals and events had on the Fed, and examines the Fed's influence on international affairs. Starting with the works of Henry Thornton, Walter Bagehot, and Irving Fisher, he discusses the European origins of the model for the Fed; its transition from a passive to an active role in setting monetary policy; the supportive role it assumed during World Wars I and II; the impact of the 1927-29 stock market boom, the Great Depression, and the recessions of 1920-21, 1937-38, and 1947-48; and the key events that led to the Fed's independence in 1951. Also useful is the description of the key roles that Woodrow Wilson, Carter Glass, Benjamin Strong, Marriner S. Eccles, and Allan Sproul played in the development of the system. This well-written and thoroughgoing account is recommended for academic, business, and public libraries.
Norm Hutcherson, California State Univ. Lib., Bakersfield
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Review
“A History of the Federal Reserve will be the definitive history of the central bank and monetary policy in the United States for the indefinite future. Every student of the American economy during the period of this account will find something of interest here, and anyone seeking to fathom the ‘big picture’ of economic policy during these years will be greatly enlightened by reading this extraordinary work of scholarship.” (Business History Review 2011-11-07)
From the Inside Flap
Allan H. Meltzer's monumental history of the Federal Reserve System tells the story of one of America's most influential but least understood public institutions. This first volume covers the period from the Federal Reserve's founding in 1913 through the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, which marked the beginning of a larger and greatly changed institution.
To understand why the Federal Reserve acted as it did at key points in its history, Meltzer draws on meeting minutes, correspondence, and other internal documents (many made public only during the 1970s) to trace the reasoning behind its policy decisions. He explains, for instance, why the Federal Reserve remained passive throughout most of the economic decline that led to the Great Depression, and how the Board's actions helped to produce the deep recession of 1937 and 1938. He also highlights the impact on the institution of individuals such as Benjamin Strong, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the 1920s, who played a key role in the adoption of a more active monetary policy by the Federal Reserve. Meltzer also examines the influence the Federal Reserve has had on international affairs, from attempts to build a new international financial system in the 1920s to the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 that established the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and the failure of the London Economic Conference of 1933.
Written by one of the world's leading economists, this magisterial biography of the Federal Reserve and the people who helped shape it will interest economists, central bankers, historians, political scientists, policymakers, and anyone seeking a deep understanding of the institution that controls America's purse strings.
Most helpful customer reviews
66 of 70 people found the following review helpful.
Not for the layman
By Franklin Noll
This much heralded account of the Federal Reserve is justly lauded in academic circles because Meltzer brings forth many Fed documents which have long been buried away and unavailable to scholars. He is able to pursue step-by-step Fed actions and relate what happened in all those many meetings behind closed doors. Through the mass of information he has uncovered and his own in-depth knowledge of monetary policy and the Fed, he is able to bring new facts to light and correct previous interpretations that are more often than not those of Friedman and Schwartz's A Monetary History of the United States.
The weaknesses of Meltzer's book stem from his massive archive of information and the strength of his predecessors. The sheer volume of information he is trying to convey prompts the narrative to drift and the reader sometimes loses the point. And, as a good academic historian, he is engaged in a dialogue with other historians of the Fed and monetary policy that can push the layman to the sidelines. Meltzer's history assumes the reader has a rather advanced knowledge of economics and finance such as an understanding of the real bills doctrine and the operation of an international gold standard. Also, the charts and tables are often not very helpful in understanding the text or at least could have been presented in a better manner.
Overall, Meltzer does not produce any stunning revelations but a great many correctives to previous accounts and much added detail. The novice to the history of US monetary policy would do better to read Richard Timberlake's book (though taken with a grain of salt because of its conservative leanings) or the classic work by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz.
15 of 17 people found the following review helpful.
Comprehensive, but could have used an editor
By Hal Jordan
In modern scholarly publishing, the author is largely on his own. If the book is to read smoothly and be free of errors, it's pretty much up to the author -- or the author's friends and colleagues -- to do the careful proofreading required, especially in a book of this length. Perhaps not too surprisingly, Meltzer having finished the prodigious labor of writing this volume -- and with two more lengthy volumes still to write! -- did not, in fact, do much proofreading. Honestly, this book is what in an earlier day would have been seen as a first draft. A monumental, incredibly well researched first draft, but a first draft nonetheless. As a result, there a significant number of typos or small errors. To take one of many, the large New York City bank that failed in October 1930 was the Bank of United States, not the Bank of the United States, as Meltzer has it. The reasons why the bank's founders dropped the "the" in the bank's name is actually a significant story, albeit one that Meltzer omits.
Apart from these minor blemishes, the apparent failure to significantly revise the manuscript results in problems with the narrative flow. It's not just that the level of detail is a bit excessive or the discussion often drifts from the main point -- a failing noted by one of the other reviewers -- but people and incidents are discussed on one page, dropped, and then picked up again dozens of pages later with the reader expected to have perfect recall of the earlier mention. This problem is made worse by the fact that the index is rather sketchy. So, trying to find the earlier reference to a person or incident is difficult. These are things a good editor would have caught, if Meltzer had had one.
Leaving these points aside -- and they aren't trivial because they significantly reduce the readability of the book -- Meltzer's history is as definitive as we are ever likely to get. Anyone who writes about the early history of the Fed will have to take Meltzer into account.
21 of 29 people found the following review helpful.
More Proof Central Planning Does Not Work
By Suo Marte
After 2,000 pages of exhaustive scholarship detailing the history of the US Federal Reserve over the past 97 years, it's no wonder Meltzer is quoted as saying "Capitalism w/o failure is like religion w/o sin." However, as Meltzer makes clear throughout Vols 1 & 2 of this extraordinary book, the Federal Reserve is an agent of Congress w/ a Govt-granted monopoly over the US money supply to achieve specific economic and social outcomes. Literally speaking, by definition, there's nothing "capitalist" about the Federal Reserve. Meltzer's magnum opus demonstrates the Federal Reserve is simply a politically motivated central planning bureau whose inherent hubris dooms it to failure, like all other permutations of statist organization. On pg 1217 Meltzer writes: "political interferences or pressure and mistaken beliefs" are the two primary reasons for the Federal Reserve's policy errors. And perhaps nothing demonstrates more starkly the complete unmitigated failure of the Federal Reserve than it's two greatest successes; (1) correcting its previous inflationary policy error (Chapter 8 Vol 2, Book 2 "Disinflation" pgs 1008-1131) and (2) the so-called Great Moderation orchestrated by the very same Federal Reserve Chairman (who most believe) is at least partly (if not mostly) responsible for the current US financial mess (Chapter 10 Vol 2, Book 2, particularly pgs 1248-50). Meltzer's bottom line, on pg 1255: "The broader lesson of this experience [our current mess] should be that policy misjudgments by Congress and the Federal Reserve helped to bring on the crisis. Discretionary policy failed in 1929-33, in 1965-80, and now." The ultimate irony is the Govt's Federal Reserve medicine has proven to be worse than the Govt created National Banking Act illness this medicine was intended to cure 97 years ago. Equally troubling, Meltzer says: "The Federal Reserve should announce and follow a rule for its lender-of-last resort actions." In other words, after almost 100 years of existence, the Federal Reserve cannot fulfill even its most basic function. And some argue it is this fundamental responsibility itself (the "Greenspan Put" in today's parlance) that is the fountainhead of moral hazard. But it is Meltzer's other key conclusion, also on pg 1255: "The lesson should be less discretion and more rule-like behavior" that brings us full circle indeed. What was it again Hayek said about the fatal conceit of central planners?
Having said all this, I believe it's important to reiterate Meltzer's point on pg x of the Preface to Vol 2, Book 1 in which he acknowledges "the high level of integrity and purposefulness of the principals and the staffs" and the fact that "More than ninety years passed w/o major scandal" and also that "There are few examples of leaked information." There is no - nor has there ever been a - conspiracy by evildoer "banksters" controlling the Federal Reserve to line their pockets at the expense of the American people. But perhaps the real heroes of this story are Henry Thornton (for correct theory) and Paul Volcker (for correct action). And, to the extent there is a villain, it is the notion that fractional reserve lending managed by a central bank can do more good than harm; that it is somehow the best possible monetary system alternative. W/o saying so, Meltzer proves again what others have penned before: "It is a melancholy fact that each generation must relearn the fundamental principles of money in the bitter school of experience. It is the mismanagement of the monetary mechanism that most of our recent troubles are chiefly ascribable." Clearly, central planning does not work & it's a tragedy hundreds of millions (if not billions) of innocent people must suffer the impoverishing consequences of central planning's repeated failures.
Considering the ignorance, misrepresentations (& blatant lies) told to absolve the Federal Reserve of its responsibility for creating the Great Depression (through its monetary policy errors both before & after Oct 1929), one can only wish pgs 245-414 in Vol 1 will someday become required reading for ALL Americans. Meltzer's done an excellent job describing the Federal Reserve's confused monetary policies and explaining the policy dispute amongst Federal Reserve leaders that plagued it throughout its formative years: the ability of a reserve bank to control the volume of credit or money by limiting discounts to real bills and understanding that the collateral offered to the reserve banks has no fixed or logical connection to the marginal use of bank credit. Meltzer writes: "Strong understood... banks borrow in the most efficient way and lend for the most profitable uses." The fact that real bills doctrine advocates like Miller, other Federal Reserve Board members, and members of Congress such as Carter Glass did not accept Strong's conclusion does not change the fact that Strong was correct. Meltzer's even included testimony from the 1931 Senate Committee on Banking and Currency hearing in which Federal Reserve Governor Harrison explained to Senator Glass why bankers cannot prevent underwriting so-called "speculative" loans, even if they want to.
Further, Meltzer's work in Vol 1 exposes the mythology (propagated by DeLong, Eichengreen, Friedman & Bernanke) that Federal Reserve policy was influenced by economists such as Hayek. As Meltzer explains on pg 263 Vol 1: "Miller, other Board members, and several reserve bank governors accepted the real bills doctrine as the only correct guide to policy action. The Federal Reserve Act was written by people who accepted "real bills" and the gold standard as proper guides..." (as advocated by Adam Smith). Hayek & Mises adamantly opposed the real bills doctrine based on Thornton's reasoning cited by Meltzer in Vol 1. How can so-called "scholars" like DeLong & Eichengreen unknowingly conflate the views of Hayek & Mises w/ support for the real bills doctrine?
And Meltzer's done a wonderful job weaving seemingly arcane technical details (the call money market financing mechanism, for example) into the story. Meltzer points out Strong agreed w/ Warburg that an acceptance market was needed to replace the call loan market for short-term credit which Warburg had publicly campaigned against as early as 1907 and attempted to eliminate in the Aldrich Plan (which was the basis for the Federal Reserve Act).
It's also important to highlight the role politics played in the Federal Reserve's actions leading up to the Oct 1929 stock market crash: "Political concerns reinforced the Board's desire to hold the discount rate at 5%. Higher discount rates in the early twenties had been extremely unpopular in Congress and in agricultural areas. Neither the Board nor the reserve banks wanted to repeat that experience. The Board felt the pressure directly from members of Congress, many of whom, like Carter Glass, believed that credit was financing speculation, not commerce and agriculture. Higher rates, they believed, would deprive legitimate users of credit w/o deterring speculators. Miller and other Board members shared this view." Meltzer proves the motivation for Strong's 1927 discount rate cut (his famous "little coup de whiskey to the stock market") was to help the British specifically & the Europeans in general who were suffering the economic consequences of their not following the rules of the interwar gold exchange standard. There is zero evidence Strong or the Federal Reserve Board were "captured" by Wall Street bankers.
Other key areas to read are; Vol 1, Book 1 Chapter 2 ("Central Banking Theory and Practice before the Federal Reserve Act"), Vol 2, Book 1 ("Introduction"), Vol 2, Book 1 ("The Great Inflation: Phase 1"), and absolutely every page of Vol 2, Book 2.
Chapter 5 Vol 2, Book 2 provides important historical context for the current currency war saber rattling re: China's fixed exchange rate to the US dollar; the quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve & the Bank of Japan; and the threat of imposing capital controls by emerging market Govts to resist the inflationary disruptions fast approaching them in the form of massive liquidity looking for yield, courtesy of the US Federal Reserve. This chapter demonstrates how fixed exchange rates w/in a gold standard environment can work --- PROVIDED countries adjust (increase their money supply when gold inflows increase & reduce when gold outflows) in accordance w/ the rules. Meltzer's work throughout Vols 1 & 2 demonstrates the classical gold standard was successful until it was suspended by WWI. Govts have been unable to return to the monetary discipline the standard requires to function properly; the interwar gold exchange standard (different from the classical gold standard before WWI) between 1924-1933 & Bretton Woods are two examples of Govt failure to follow the rules.
Meltzer describes in detail how the British (by joining the gold exchange standard at a rate that overvalued its currency), the French (by stabilizing its currency at an undervalued exchange rate, by refusing to hold foreign currency as reserves & most significantly by refusing to increase its money supply w/ gold inflows - "sterilization"), and the US (by sterilizing gold inflows like France) did not follow the rules between 1924-1933. On pg 276-7 Vol 1 Meltzer notes France "contributed to the onset and severity of the world depression by sterilizing much of its gold inflow. From June 1928 to Sept 1929, the French bought $2.6 billion in gold..." and "Greater expansion and less sterilization by the Bank of France would have lessened the severity and scope of the world decline." This conclusion is consistent w/ H Clark Johnson's previous work (1997). On pg 401 Vol 1 Meltzer explains the consequences of the US Federal Reserve's gold sterilization: "If the US had followed the rules, the money stock would have expanded by 14.6% from August 1929 to June 1930... an expansive monetary policy would have prevented at least some of the deflation and recession, so falling prices and fears of collapse would have been absent. The world would have been spared much of what followed." Meltzer demonstrates the Federal Reserve's real bills doctrine mindset, using the "Riefler-Burgess framework," focused the central bank on exactly the wrong signals for determining "loose" and "tight" monetary policy. And it was precisely this policy error --- concentrating on bank reserves above the legal minimum necessary to cover deposits for setting NOMINAL interest rates; instead of concentrating on the quantity of money, available credit and general economic conditions on inflation-adjusted REAL interest rates --- that resulted in its post Oct 1929 policy failure and consequently the impoverishment of millions of Americans. Eichengreen's blaming the gold standard for the Great Depression is simply wrong - he throws the baby out w/ the bath water.
Based on this history in Vol 1, no one should be surprised that, by Chapter 5 Vol 2, Book 2, Govts want their cake and to eat it too; they will never follow international monetary rules (for very long) because they believe they cannot remain in power w/in their home country while, at the same time, sustain policies supporting free capital movement, currency convertibility, fixed exchange rates and full employment. As Meltzer says on pg 688: "The choice was never a serious issue for the US; the Johnson and Nixon administrations always chose employment. The Federal Reserve retreated behind the institutional fact that the Treasury and the administration were responsible for international policy." Read Chapter 5 Vol 2, Book 2 and then re-consider the actions today by Chairman Bernanke, Congress & the Obama Administration. Moreover, the long standing US current account deficits described in this chapter completely undermine the legitimacy of the Greenspan / Bernanke "Blame the Asian Savers" rationale for causing the current US financial crisis.
Understanding how Volcker tamed inflation alone is worth the price of Vol 2, Book 2. Moreover, like Chapter 5, Chapter 8 is also extremely relevant today. It's widely understood the Federal Reserve is about to print another trillion (or so) of money out of thin air (AKA "Quantitative Easing") by purchasing US Govt debt. And it's also widely understood that once this money injection enters global circulation, asset values will inflate and potentially consumer prices (as measured by the CPI) as well. But it's not understood how the Federal Reserve will drain this liquidity w/o further damaging the global economy. This is where Chairman Volcker's outstanding work, detailed in Chapter 8 Vol 2, Book 2, becomes important. Should inflation spike, the Federal Reserve will have to build on the successful Volcker play book to fix the inflationary consequences of its Quantitative Easing.
Each of these chapters can be read stand-alone w/o the others; they are complete w/in themselves. Also, Meltzer's told this story in very accessible, plain language the general reader can understand (no algebra or calculus here). As Meltzer quotes Volcker: "People don't need an advanced course in economics to understand that inflation has something to do with too much money." And my favorite Volcker quote is this: "With the best staff in the world and all the computing power we could give them, there could never be any certainty about just the right level of the federal funds rate to keep the money supply on the right path and to regulate economic activity."
Everyone interested in the Federal Reserve and/or the practical application of fractional reserve central banking absolutely must read this book. ALL journalists should read all three volumes, not just the Federal Reserve apologists at the WSJ (Wessel, Izzo, etc). And those most urgently in need of absorbing its lessons are the very economists the media elites shove down our throats every day on television, the internet & in print; Krugman, Zandi, Blinder, C Romer, DeLong, Eichengreen & even Roubini. This book proves they are either ignorant or merely partisans practicing extreme ideological myopia in order to impose their normative economic visions on the rest of us through Govt coercion. This epic book is the ultimate case for abolishing the Federal Reserve (although I'm confident Meltzer would say this is NOT his intent). If Americans understood the truth, the Federal Reserve would quickly find a comfortable resting spot next to Biddle's 2nd Bank of the United States - in the graveyard of failed monetary ideas.
Please purchase all three volumes of this book. You will be richly rewarded.
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